Criminal law and republican liberty: Philip Pettit's account by Horder, Jeremy
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198443 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from LSE Law, Society and Economy Working 
Papers at: www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps.htm and the Social Sciences Research 
Network electronic library at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=3198443. 
© Jeremy Horder. Users may download and/or print one copy to facilitate their private study or 
for non-commercial research. Users may not engage in further distribution of this material or 
use it for any profit-making activities or any other form of commercial gain. 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law and Republican Liberty: 
Philip Pettit’s Account 
 
 
 
Jeremy Horder 
 
 
 
LSE Law, Society and Economy Working Papers 10/2018 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Law Department 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3198443 
 
 
 
 
Criminal Law and Republican Liberty: 
Philip Pettit’s Account 
 
 
 
 
Jeremy Horder * 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Philip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of 
freedom – republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can make choices 
without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does not itself depend on 
another’s forbearance (what Pettit calls ‘formal’ freedom). To be worth having, my freedoms 
must not be at the mercy of some other person, making me subject to their domination. Pettit 
believes that the principal justification for the traditional focus of the criminal law is that it 
constitutes a bulwark against domination. I will be considering the merits of this claim. Is the 
importance of the orthodox realm of the criminal law solely or mainly explained by the wish to 
protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not, even though there are 
some instances in which it provides such protection. Across the board, the criminal law rightly 
protects us equally from threats to what Pettit calls ‘effective’, as opposed to formal, republican 
freedom. 
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1. UNDERSTANDING FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION. 
 
Philip Pettit has made central to modern republican theory a distinctive account of 
freedom – republican freedom. On this account, I am not free solely because I can 
make choices without interference. I am truly free, only if that non-interference does 
not itself depend on another’s forbearance. To be worth having, my freedoms must 
not be at the mercy of some other person, even someone kindly disposed towards 
me.1 This is not an anarchistic or anti-authoritarian theory. Someone (X) may, 
perfectly legitimately, have power over another person (Y) in the republican state; 
but the legitimacy of the power turns on whether the choices X can make for Y 
must, ‘track the avowed or readily avowable interests of the other [or whether]… X 
can interfere according to their own arbitrium or decision’.2 To avoid domination in 
the use of his or her power, X must also avoid using it to impose, ‘alien ideas or 
interests’ on Y.3 Pettit illustrates his republican conception of freedom by reference 
to the difference in status of a slave, who is for whatever reason not currently 
controlled by a master (‘servus sine domino’), and a person whose status means that 
they may not be subjected to the will of another at all (the ‘liber’): 
 
The liber may be unfortunate enough to suffer a great deal of interference and 
the servus sine domino may be lucky enough, or cunning or fawning enough, to 
avoid such interference. But the liber is nonetheless the free one among the 
two, for freedom is determined not by fortune but by the standing that one 
has within the community, and especially before the law. To be a free person, 
to be a liber, is to be in a position to call the law out against anyone who 
interferes or tries to interfere; it is to have the backing of the law against such 
interference, whether the threat comes from other private individuals or from 
the officials of the state itself. The servus sine domino lacks that protected status, 
even if the servus manages to escape interference. And so the servus is not free.4 
 
The ‘liber’ enjoys a uniquely important freedom that Petit calls freedom as ‘non-
domination’,5 a freedom as important in relations between lower-level state official 
and citizens, and as between private citizens, as it is between national governments 
and citizens.6 Blackstone himself warned of the risk to personal liberty from the 
existence of powers of domination, even though ultimately he acknowledged the 
need for such powers: 
                                                      
1 Philip Pettit, ‘Criminalisation in Republican Theory’, in RA Duff et al, Criminalisation: The Political 
Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), ch 5. 
2 Philip Pettit, ‘Keeping Republican Freedom Simple: On a Difference with Quentin Skinner’ (2002) 30 
Political Theory 339, at 342. 
3 Philip Pettit, ‘Republican Theory and Criminal Punishment’ (1997) 9 Utilitas 60, at 61. 
4 Philip Pettit, The Common mind: an Essay on Psychology, Society and Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1996), at 311. 
5 Philip Pettit, n. 1, at 136. 
6 Ibid., at 139. 
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Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty; 
for if once it were left in the power of any the highest magistrate to imprison 
arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper… there would soon be 
an end of all other rights and immunities.7  
 
The scope of domination is narrow in significant respects. For example, according 
to Pettit, one cannot exercise domination accidentally or even (merely) knowingly. 
The exercise of domination must be ‘intentional’.8 Freedom from intentional 
domination is what Pettit refers to as, ‘formal republican freedom’.9 Such limits to 
the wrong of domination – the denial of formal freedom - bring to mind critiques 
of the sociological analysis of the exercise of power in terms of intentional action.10 
If D generally gets his way because people fear his ferocious appearance, or are 
drawn to his charisma, D will not be getting his way through an exercise of 
domination (on Pettit’s account), unless D is intentionally using these characteristics 
to that end. Analogously, suppose that people in social class B simply believe 
themselves to be inferior to people in social class A, and for that reason defer to the 
latter. In such a situation, those in social class A may be able to exercise substantial 
– and perhaps unjustified - control over the lives of those in social class B, without 
the intentional use of domination in Pettit’s sense.  
Real enough though the distinction may be between intentional and (merely) 
knowing control or power over others, we might pause to ask whether Pettit does 
enough to explain why the distinction should dictate the moral orientation of a 
political – or legal – theory. Should we not be equally concerned with all unjustified 
and avoidable threats to some people’s autonomy, stemming from control or power 
possessed by other people? For such reasons, Vincent Chiao argues that, ‘Pettit’s 
ideal of non-domination is best understood as a response to people standing in 
relations of subordination or social inferiority rather than sheer subjection to the 
unconstrained will of others’.11 We will encounter this issue again in due course, but 
in relation to this issue, before moving on we must consider the other dimension to 
Pettit’s theory of freedom, effective republican freedom. 
It is important to note that it is not Pettit’s claim that the absence of formal 
republican freedom, domination, is the only significant social or political ill liable to 
befall someone over the life course. For Pettit, of lesser importance, but still 
significant, is, ‘effective republican freedom’ (alongside formal freedom).12 Effective 
republican freedom exists when, to an adequate degree, one does not face (or is 
adequately insulated from the deleterious effects of) unintentional obstacles to, 
                                                      
7 Sir William Blackstone (1765), Commentaries on the Laws of England (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1765), vol I, 
at 98. 
8 Philip Pettit, n. 2 above, at 342-43. 
9 Ibid., at 343. 
10 Stephen Lukes, Power: A Radical View (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), first published in 1977. 
11 Vincent Chiao, ‘Discretion and Domination in Criminal Procedure: Reflections on Pettit’ (2015) 15 
Politics, Philosophy and Economics 92, at 101. 
12 Philip Pettit, n. 2 above, at 343. 
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‘uninterfered-with choice’.13 Such unintentional obstacles include ‘poverty, ill health, 
handicap or lack of talent, or obstacles that are unintended effects of what others 
do’.14 An ingrained sense of social inferiority would fall into this category, as a form 
of unintentional obstacle. In the example just given, social class B could be said to 
lack effective republican freedom, even if they did not lack formal republican 
freedom. 
Pettit purports to follow classical Roman exponents of republican thinking, in 
suggesting that it is other-things-being-equal worse to be subject to domination (but 
to be free from unintentional obstacles to free choice), that it is to be assailed by 
unintentional obstacles to free choice (but subject to domination), although the 
minimisation of unintentional obstacles is morally and politically important.15 That 
is because unintentional obstacles to free choice are just obstacles, and not the 
supposedly more serious challenge of ‘interference’ in one’s chosen life. Pettit would 
share the sentiment inspiring Chief Sitting Bull’s famous words, ‘Now that we are 
poor, we are free. No white man controls our footsteps’. 
Pettit seeks to illustrate his thesis through a criminal law example. To suffer 
physical harm from an assault is (he thinks) to suffer harm from domination by the 
criminal. By contrast, suppose one suffered the same kind of physical harm in some 
kind of accident – even an accident caused by gross negligence. Then, the harm 
would not have been brought about by domination, and it is the presence of 
domination, ‘that explains why, intuitively, it is worse to have one’s choices reduced 
by crime than by an unintended, perhaps purely natural, accident’.16 The use of this 
example is significant, because Pettit believes that the principal justification for the 
criminal law is as a bulwark against domination. He says: 
 
[C]riminal law will serve to establish the protections that each can expect to 
enjoy against particularly egregious forms of dominating interference that any 
others may seek to practise against them.17 
 
I will be considering the merits of this claim. Is the criminal law, or at least the part 
of it with which Pettit concerns himself,18 solely or mainly driven by the wish to 
protect people from domination? In short, the answer is that it is not, even though 
there are some instances in which it provides such protection, because the criminal 
law protects us equally – if not more so - from threats to effective republican 
freedom. 
                                                      
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Ibid., at 344. 
17 Philip Pettit, n. 1, at 139. 
18 Pettit concern is a ‘textbook’ concern with offences against the person and property etc., and not with 
the vast bulk of criminal law, in the form of regulatory offences. 
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The descriptive difficulties faced by Pettit’s theory, as it applies to the criminal 
law, mirror a broader worry about his thesis (alluded to above) considered as a 
political theory. The idea that domination is wrong is familiar to a number of 
thinkers in the 20th century liberal tradition. For example, as John Finnis rightly 
observed nearly 40 years ago: 
 
Individuals can only be 'selves' - i.e. have the 'dignity ' of being 'responsible 
agents' - if they are not made to live their lives for the convenience of others 
but are allowed and assisted to create a subsisting identity across a 'lifetime'.19 
 
However, by way of contrast with Pettit, writers in the liberal tradition do not mark 
out the wrong of domination for special condemnation, or argue that the law’s most 
powerful deterrent and retributive tool - the criminal law – should be especially 
concerned with it, even though such writers recognise the distinction between 
formal and effective republican freedom on which Pettit draws. Instead, like 
criminal lawyers, liberal thinkers – driven by an overriding concern for the 
conditions in which autonomy flourishes - are more apt to take equally seriously 
threats to what Pettit calls effective republican theory. 
 
 
 
2. DOMINATION IN THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE. 
 
The criminal law is part of a criminal justice system that is largely founded on 
discretionary powers, many of which will possess the structural features of -will be 
- powers to dominate the lives of others.20 Even so, in the reasonably just state, such 
powers will fall outside the scope of Pettit’s prohibition on domination. That is 
because, in such a state, it will not be possible to exercise such powers lawfully 
without an overriding regard to the public interest. In particular, it will never be 
lawful to exercise such powers merely to suit the convenience, wishes or ‘arbitrium’21 
of the power-holder.  
It is possible to think of instances in which self-serving considerations may 
enter into decisions made in the exercise of discretionary powers. A police officer 
might, for example, delay for a short time arresting a suspect until it stops raining, 
purely so that the officer will not get wet in making the arrest. Such a self-serving 
use of a discretion would be lawful, on Pettit’s republican account of the limits on 
public power, only so long as it was clear that the public interest would not be 
affected by the delay (and so long as this consideration features in the officer’s 
reasoning, as he or she shelters indoors). Having said that, if this was all there was 
to Pettit’s theory, it would not amount to much. It would be purely negative in 
                                                      
19 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980), at 272. 
20 In the case of the law of England and Wales, see Jeremy Horder (ed), Ashworth’s Principles of Criminal 
Law (8th edition, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016), ch 1. 
21 See text at n. 2 above. 
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content: a prohibition on the use of powers over others for (purely) self-serving 
reasons. That Pettit’s theory goes beyond this can be seen if we re-consider the 
passage cited at the outset.  
In a state free from domination, a citizen’s legal standing is crucial. He or she 
must be, ‘in a position to call the law out against anyone who interferes or tries to 
interfere’.22 The citizen must have the backing of the law against interference, 
‘whether the threat comes from other private individuals or from the officials of the 
state itself’.23 That suggests Pettit has a wider-ranging objection to discretionary 
powers as such. Someone cannot so easily ‘call the law out’ against interference, if 
the determination of what the law permits (in terms of interference) itself turns on 
a discretionary assessment by a legal official, whether that assessment is driven by 
self-serving or entirely by public interest-centred considerations. A legal system 
largely characterised by wide-ranging discretionary powers in the hands of officials 
is inimical to what Pettit calls the ‘resilient property’ of non-interference by the 
state.24 In a state that protects such non-interference, as Pettit frequently puts it:  
 
[F]ree persons can walk tall, and look each other in the eye…. [T]hey relate to 
one another in a shared, mutually reinforcing consciousness of enjoying this 
independence.25 
 
Pettit’s stance is reminiscent of the push back against discretionary powers given 
prominence in early 20th century England by Lord Hewart, when he was Lord Chief 
Justice.26 Pettit’s stance appears naive for the same reasons. It is long established 
that officials exercising discretionary powers – at many different levels within the 
state apparatus – may be wrong to decide as they do, yet (being within the bounds 
of reasonableness) still be justified even when, say, they prioritise bureaucratic 
concerns over those of an individual citizen.27 This is a commonplace legal 
proposition. As long ago as 1933, in his famous critique of Lord Hewart’s court-
focused legalism, John Willis said: 
 
                                                      
22 See text at n. 4 above. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Philip Pettit, ‘Negative Liberty, Liberal and Republican’ (1993) 1 European Journal of Philosophy 15, at 
16. 
25 Philip Pettit, n. 1 above, at 138. 
26 Lord Hewart, The New Despotism (London: Ernest Benn, 1929). 
27 R v Port of London Authority Ex Parte Kynoch Ltd [1919] 1 KB 176; British Oxygen Company Ltd v Board of 
Trade [1971] AC 610. These cases set the terms of rational bureaucratic engagement: developing general 
policy to cover the bulk of cases, whilst remaining open to the possibility that an individual case might 
have to be treated differently. 
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It has always been difficult, and with the increasing scope of Governmental 
interference it has become almost an impossibility, to discriminate between a 
legislative and a so-called administrative discretion.28 
 
Commonplace though such remarks may be, they are hard to square with Pettit’s 
emphasis on the ubiquitous need for citizens, vis-à-vis officials as well as each other, 
‘to… walk tall, and look each other in the eye [not depending] on anyone’s grace or 
favour for being able to choose their mode of life’.29 
In fact, flourishing democratic-bureaucratic states do seek to encourage the 
important public good described by Pettit in the passage just cited, but not – as 
Pettit would seemingly have us do – by reducing the scope for discretionary 
decision-making. Instead, they seek to do it through shaping the values that infuse 
the exercise of such decision-making, and by making those values open to public 
scrutiny and critique. To give a criminal law example, an adult seeking assistance to 
commit suicide must rely on a favourable exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the 
prosecution services, if he or she is to avoid involving those providing the assistance 
in serious criminal activity.30 That puts him or her in a position of legalised 
domination, with respect to the prosecution authorities. Yet, the basis on which 
prosecutorial discretion must be exercised has been the subject of judicial guidance, 
public scrutiny and debate.31 It is by no means obvious that this position is worse 
than a state of affairs in which domination is in theory eliminated, in that all cases 
of assisted suicide are prosecuted (but where in practice domination continues 
through unregulated use of prosecutorial discretion), or alternatively, in which the 
practice of assisted suicide is legalised in an unrestricted way.32 
There have been attempts, on the part of some courts and liberal scholars, to 
conceive of the substantive criminal law in more republican terms, in Pettit’s formal 
sense, and hence to eliminate the scope for the use of discretionary power and hence 
domination. So, courts have emphasised, for example, the special need for certainty 
in the interpretation of the scope of the criminal law,33 and for similar reasons, 
Ronald Dworkin exempted the criminal law from his general theory of common 
law interpretation: 
 
In one department, criminal law, Anglo-American practice is very close to 
unilateralism. We believe that no one should be found guilty of a crime unless 
                                                      
28 John Willis, The Parliamentary Powers of English Government Departments (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 1933), 
at 47. See further, Jeremy Horder, ‘Excusing Information-Provision Crimes in the Bureaucratic State’ 
(2015) 68 Current Legal Problems 197. 
29 Philip Pettit, n. 1 above, at 138. 
30 R (on the application of Pretty) v Director of Public Prosecutions [2001] UKHL 61. 
31 https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/policy-prosecutors-respect-cases-encouraging-or-assisting-
suicide. 
32 Lukes’ remarks about the limits of altruism seem pertinent here, even though he is not speaking of 
assisted suicide cases: ‘Even under altruism, there will be a need to protect people from others’ mistakes 
about what altruism requires’: Steven Lukes, Marxism and Morality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), at 66. 
33 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234; Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of the London Borough of 
Southwark [2010] UKSC 28. 
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the statute or other piece of legislation establishing that crime is so clear that 
he must have known his act was criminal, or would have known if he had made 
any serious attempt to discover whether it was…. But our legal practice is not 
unilateralist in this way over the broad reaches of the private law that we have 
mostly been discussing.34 
 
Understandable though it might seem that one would, for republican reasons, wish 
to support ‘unilateralism’ in the criminal law, unilateralism is neither descriptively 
accurate nor morally attractive. It is, for example, frequently necessary and desirable 
to use open-textured norms such as ‘(un)reasonable,’ ‘(un)justified,’ or 
(un)warranted’ in the definition of criminal conduct, notwithstanding the 
discretionary element that this introduces into the scope of the criminal law, in the 
hands of judge or jury.35 This is the case when it would be arbitrary, and perhaps 
even more confusing, to seek to capture the criminal offence through the 
specification of individual instances of wrongful conduct.36  
Further, the criminal law must often employ terminology or concepts far 
removed from lay discourse. It must do this, even though to do so is bound to 
frustrate any attempt by lay people fully to inform themselves of their obligations in 
the way Dworkin supposes that they should be able to do. Key parts of the criminal 
law – the definition of ‘property’ in theft being an example – are necessarily in part 
aimed at experts who apply and administer the law, rather than at private citizens. 
Section 4 of the Theft Act 1968 says that land may only be stolen, inter alia, when 
the defendant, ‘is a trustee or personal representative, or is authorised by power of 
attorney, or as liquidator of a company, or otherwise, to sell or dispose of land 
belonging to another’. In so saying, the 1968 Act is speaking principally to the 
lawyer, prosecutor or judge, rather than to the lay person; but not wrongly, in spite 
of the fact that section 4 clearly thereby fails the test of clarity set down by Dworkin 
for a ‘unilateralist’ (republican) criminal law. Criminal laws are not simply commands 
aimed at governing citizens, imposing what can be called ‘conformity obligations’. 
Criminal laws must, perhaps principally, serve normatively to empower officials 
whose obligation it is to interpret and – exercising their discretion appropriately - 
enforce such laws: what can be called ‘compliance’ obligations.37 As a set of 
prohibitions, the traditional criminal law constitutes in part a set of declaratory 
(defining), duty-imposing and power-conferring norms that shape the way in which 
the protection of ‘life and liberty [etc]’ may be upheld by state officials, through the 
exercise of their discretion. 
                                                      
34 Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (London: Fontana, 1986), 143, discussed in Jeremy Horder, ‘Criminal 
Law and Legal Positivism’ (2002) 8 Legal Theory 221. 
35 Jeremy Horder, n. 34 above, at 233-34. 
36 Jeremy Horder, n. 34 above. See further, Timothy Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ 
(1999) 19 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1. 
37 See the discussion in Jeremy Horder, n. 34 above.  
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3. PREVENTING DOMINATION AND THE GOALS OF THE 
CRIMINAL LAW. 
 
It is clear that Pettit supports a broadly liberal-democratic conception of criminal 
law and justice. For traditionalists working within a liberal framework, Pettit’s vision 
of a republican criminal law is in fact reassuringly familiar. He favours parsimony in 
the use of the substantive criminal law,38 limitations on the powers of the police and 
prosecutors,39 restrictions on judicial discretion in sentencing,40 and proportionality 
in punishment.41 There is not much anti-liberal radicalism here. Nonetheless, Petit 
believes that his account of freedom has significant implications for criminal law 
theory. As he puts it, ‘[T]he most crucial idea for a theory of criminalisation is that 
of equal freedom as non-domination’.42 This basic contention is shared by Alon 
Harel, who argues that there is a duty to criminalise invasions of, ‘basic rights to life 
and liberty’, because in the absence of such criminalisation individuals, ‘live at the 
mercy of others’.43  
However, Harel goes considerably further. For him, the relevant criminal law 
protections should be constitutionally entrenched, to avoid a situation in which the 
protections for life and liberty are, ‘contingent upon the judgments and inclinations 
of the legislature’.44 The latter argument seems vulnerable to Jeremy Waldron’s 
objection that democratic legitimacy not only has intrinsic value, but may also be 
morally more important than giving (effective45) constitutional immunity from 
democratic change to the – typically, judicial - guardians of the constitution.46 
Further, Harel’s suggestion risks fossilising provisions in a morally unsatisfactory 
way. By constitutionally entrenching a prohibition on murder, for example, we 
(effectively) prevent, ‘the judgment and inclinations of the [democratic] legislature’ 
from leading to a modification to the law in order to experiment with legalising 
euthanasia in some form, even if the legislature has a clear democratic mandate to 
make such a change.47 It is hard to see how the political environment for the criminal 
law is improved by effectively preventing such experimental changes, through 
constitutional entrenchment of definitional terms. There is nothing in Pettit’s 
account of republican freedom that leads one in such a direction. 
To return to Pettit’s analysis, is the raison d’être of criminal laws prohibiting 
murder, rape, pillage, and so on, that they reduce the scope for what Pettit calls, 
                                                      
38 Philip Pettit, n.1, at 143. 
39 Ibid., at 147. 
40 Ibid., at 148. 
41 Ibid., at 146. 
42 Ibid., at 136. 
43 Alon Harel, ‘The Duty to Criminalise’ (2015) 34 Law and Philosophy 1.  
44 Ibid., at 2. 
45 Meaning that constitutional change is in practice too difficult to achieve for the legislature. 
46 Jeremy Waldron, ‘A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights’ (1993) 13 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 18-51. 
47 For a discussion of the role of public opinion and the legislature in homicide reform in the UK 
context, see Jeremy Horder, Homicide and the Politics of Law Reform (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2012), ch 1. 
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‘particularly egregious forms of dominating interference’48? In a basic sense, this 
might seem to be trivially correct. Surely, without such laws, we would all be at the 
mercy of the most ruthless and the strongest? True enough. However, it does not 
follow that the prevention of domination is the principal or most plausible empirical 
or normative explanation for offences against the person or against property (and 
so on). To begin with, in Pettit’s terms, the criminal law is as much concerned with 
what he calls ‘effective’ republican freedom (unintended obstacles to or 
interferences with freedom) as it is with formal republican freedom (freedom from 
domination), and frequently fails quite deliberately to distinguish normatively 
between the two.  
To give a well-worn example, in English law, rape is committed not only when 
D intends to have sexual intercourse whether or not V consents (thereby 
manifesting the ‘will to power’ of domination over V) but also when D has non-
consensual intercourse with V without any adequate basis for believing that V 
consents.49 In the latter case, the basis for convicting V is D’s (weak or strong50) 
indifference to V’s consent; but indifference, however devastating the 
consequences, is not in itself an instantiation of domination, even if those in a 
position to dominate may be indifferent to the interests of those over whom they 
hold sway. Pettit may say that all this shows is that, in the case of rape in English 
law, effective freedom from sexual violation is – rightly - protected alongside 
freedom from the exercise of formal domination over another’s sexual autonomy. 
The example does not show, Pettit might say, that the evil of ‘indifferent’ rape is the 
same kind of evil as the (in principal, greater) evil of intentional rape. Such an 
analysis is not manifestly mistaken. However, it risks putting the demands of a 
general theory – ‘domination is the explanation for serious offences’ – ahead of 
context sensitivity in the analysis of the ways criminal wrongs are constructed. In 
that regard, it is strongly arguable that a feature of the wrong in rape is that, unlike 
some other wrongs such those involved in as homicide, it does not change in nature 
depending on whether D acts intentionally, or by contrast recklessly or negligently. 
This claim harks back to a question about Pettit’s theory raised earlier.51 How 
important really is it, morally, to follow through in law (and politics) on the 
conceptual distinction between intentional and other ways in which power and 
control may be exercised over others, such as knowingly allowing vulnerable people 
to work primarily for one’s own benefit? 
In setting out his stall, Pettit describes his focus in a variety of ways. He says 
that his theory is concerned with the, ‘most plausible’ examples of acts that should 
be criminalised, namely, ‘offences that have traditionally counted among ordinary 
                                                      
48 Philip Pettit, n.1, at 139. 
49 Sexual Offences Act 2003, s. 1(1). 
50 On ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ forms of indifference to another’s interests, see Jeremy Horder, ‘Gross 
Negligence and Criminal Culpability’ (1997) 47 University of Toronto Law Journal 495. 
51 See text following n. 10 above. 
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people as criminal…the core of criminal law.’52 These, ‘include’ fatal and non-fatal 
offences against the person or property and public order, but are generally to be 
understand as ‘mala in se’ or things bad in themselves, ‘by regular criteria’.53  Pettit’s 
overriding concern with domination by one individual over another leads to his 
concentration on offences against the person within the mala in se. But of course, 
mala in se - things bad in themselves by ‘regular criteria’ – go much further, and some 
important wrongs of this type are more difficult to explain in terms of domination. 
An example is bribery: 
 
X company (based in the UK) instructs its agent, Y (a British national), in 
Zedland, to secure a contract through bribery, if the need arises. Y is able to 
agree a contract with B, a Zedland public official, by offering B a bribe. The 
taking of bribes by public officials is generally overlooked in Zedland, because 
the practice provides a way in which public officials’ take-home pay can be 
increased without a cost to the public purse. 
 
In this example, X company, its directors, and Y, will all commit serious offences, 
contrary to the Bribery Act 2010, liable to lead – in the case of the directors and Y 
– to substantial terms of imprisonment. Bribery is without question a malum in se, a 
wrong bad in itself by ‘regular criteria’. Yet, it is hard to see wherein lies the element 
of domination in this example, and the same is true for many other financial crimes 
that are mala in se, such as false accounting, insider trading or tax evasion.  
There are certainly some crimes that directly target the exercise of wrongful 
domination. The offence in English law of, ‘controlling or coercive behaviour in an 
intimate or family relationship’ is an example.54 Sex trafficking, and kidnapping (at 
least in some of its manifestations), are two others. Further, there are the efforts to 
disrupt the authority of (and ultimately eliminate) certain types of criminal gang and 
organisation, one of the typical ends of such gangs being to establish unauthorised 
systems of domination over others;55 but such examples are the exception rather 
than the rule. How secure, though, is Pettit’s analysis of the more mainstream 
offences against the person and property, in terms of domination? Pettit says: 
 
[W]hen someone commits a crime they typically present themselves as 
dominators of the victim: they act in a way that suggests a belief that they can 
interfere on an arbitrary basis with that person. If you like, they assume a 
dominating position in relation to the victim.56 
 
                                                      
52 Philip Pettit, n. 1 above, at 143. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Serious Crime Act 2015, s. 76. 
55 See, for example, the Serious Crime Act 2007; Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) 
Amendment Act 2013 (Queensland). 
56 Philip Pettit, n. 3 above, at 68. 
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Pettit is making a descriptive claim, namely that an offence against the person 
intentionally committed – say, murder – embodies not just the normatively 
definitive intention to kill (or to cause serious harm), but also a normatively 
significant belief. This is the belief that the victim’s life ‘can’ – i.e. may permissibly – 
be ended simply because the killer wishes it. By softening his claim - describing the 
way he thinks a criminal ‘typically’ (rather than always) presents themselves – Pettit 
makes it difficult to say how much theoretical significance we should attribute to 
the claim. In this, his theory stands in contrast to the more robust neo-Hegelian 
theory of Alan Brudner, for whom, ‘desert is understood stringently’,57 and it is 
always the case that true or real crime involves an act respecting which, ‘the 
wrongdoer knowingly exercises a degree of freedom inconsistent with the equal 
freedom of the other’.58 
Even if the weaker nature of Pettit’s theory perhaps makes it less vulnerable to 
attack on the grounds of its inaccuracy as a general description of the criminal law, 
it remains problematic. What precise role is being played by a wrongdoer’s 
(mistaken) belief that they had a permission to treat a victim in an arbitrary way? It 
is possible to think of unusual circumstances in which such a belief is normatively 
active, figuring more or less directly in D’s practical reasoning. An instance could 
be where D persuades V to sign a contract that permits D to beat V when V fails to 
work hard enough (in D’s eyes) for D. In such a case, D’s belief that he or she is 
entitled to beat V, when V fails to work hard enough (as D sees it), is likely to be 
normatively ‘active’ in any instance in which D beats V for such a failure. Perhaps 
more commonly, such beliefs may be normatively more passive, forming (say) part 
of a cultural background that has explanatory power in relation to D’s conduct 
without playing a direct causal role in D’s practical reasoning. In a patriarchal 
society, domestic violence may, in spite of being illegal, be quite commonplace and 
often overlooked by the law enforcement authorities. Suppose that, in such a 
society, D loses his temper with and strikes his partner, V, when V challenges some 
demand that D has made of V. It may not be true to say that, in acting, D has drawn 
directly on a belief that he is entitled to behave – or should be excused for behaving 
- in such a violently domineering way. It may nonetheless be true that such a sense 
of entitlement (to dominate) forms part of the cultural background that explains his 
loss of temper and its violent outcome.  
In the passage cited above, Pettit appears equivocal on the issue of whether 
the belief in the right to dominate, said to be typically held by a ‘true’ criminal 
wrongdoer, is normatively active or passive in relation to the commission of 
wrongdoing. The suggestion that wrongdoers, ‘typically present themselves as 
dominators of the victim’ suggests that the belief is active (making a significant 
causal contribution), whereas the claim that wrongdoers, ‘act in a way that suggests 
                                                      
57 Alan Brudner, ‘Agency and Welfare in the Penal law’, in John Gardner, Stephen Shute and Jeremy 
Horder (eds), Action and Value in Criminal Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993), at 33. 
58 Ibid., at 32. 
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a belief that they can interfere on an arbitrary basis,’ seems to lean in favour of 
regarding the belief as more passive: present, certainly, but not necessarily exercising 
a causal influence. The issue is an important one. Pettit’s emphasis on formal 
domination as a distinct - and greater - political evil than a lack of effective 
republican freedom implies that a true case of criminal domination must, at the very 
least, involve direct reliance on a (supposed) permission to dominate the victim. By 
contrast, the existence of a cultural background that gives an imprimatur to acts that 
ought to be regarded as impermissible does no more than provide an obstacle, albeit 
a highly pernicious one, to effective republican freedom. So, the case for saying that 
the traditional realm of the criminal law primarily targets domination, rather than 
being predominantly concerned with barriers to effective republican freedom, is a 
weak one. 
What of the majority of criminal offences, regulatory offences, where there 
may be no mala in se involved? Pettit seeks to drive a wedge between such offences, 
and what he regards as truly criminal acts. For him, whereas ‘paradigm’ offences 
attract, ‘condemnation’, because, ‘almost everyone is manifestly disposed to blame 
perpetrators’,59 the creation of regulatory offences involves merely what he calls an, 
‘admission cost’ approach.60 Under such an approach, behaviour the law wishes to 
prevent has a cost attached to it – a fine – such that engagement in the behaviour 
will (if fines are set at the right level) be affordable only to a negligible number of 
people sufficiently incentivised to engage in the behaviour at the higher cost. The 
example Pettit gives is the common one of laws imposing fines for parking in a 
prohibited place.61 The implication is, on Pettit’s theory, that we do not condemn 
people for illegal parking, even when they are quite willing to pay the cost of 
continued transgressions. We simply look to the overall success of the scheme, in 
terms of a sufficient number of people seeking to avoid such costs by parking 
elsewhere. In that respect, in practice if not in theory, such schemes might appear 
to have more in common with the achievement of deterrence through taxation than 
with the ‘traditional’ criminal law. What should we make of this distinction? 
A threshold difficulty is that Pettit tends to slide between self-regarding and 
other-regarding accounts of the difference between the types of offence. So, where 
regulatory offences are concerned, he analyses them in the self-regarding terms of 
the amoral agent. He says, ‘adherents [of the law] treat [criminalisation]… in the 
manner in which… some people treat parking fines – as costs to be paid for parking 
illegally’.62 By contrast, as we have just seen, ‘paradigm’ crimes are analysed by Pettit 
in the other-regarding terms of the moral agent, someone ‘manifestly disposed to 
blame perpetrators’ for their wrongdoing.63 Yet, the choice of one perspective over 
the other in either case requires justification. Contrary to Pettit’s view, (a) the 
                                                      
59 Philip Pettit, n. 1 above, at 135. 
60 Ibid., at 134. 
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63 See text at n. 54. For the link between moral blame or condemnation, and treating someone as a moral 
agent, see the classic article by PF Strawson, ‘Freedom and Resentment’, in Gary Watson (ed), (1962) 48 
Proceedings of the British Academy 1-25. 
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classical economist might argue that we should see condemnation for wrongdoing, 
feelings of guilt, the pains of imprisonment, and so on, in a self-regarding amoral 
way as simply costs that may have to be incurred in the pursuit of certain subjectively 
valued objectives,64 and (b) the natural lawyer may argue that when regulatory 
offences are integral to a valued scheme of co-operation, imposed in the interests 
of the common good, they carry with them an other-regarding moral obligation of 
obedience, and so condemnation for breaches (albeit mild condemnation) may be 
appropriate.65 Arguably, it is more appropriate to take the other-regarding 
perspective of the moral agent for the purpose of analysis in both cases, whether 
one’s approach is broadly supportive of criminal justice institutions,66 or highly 
critical of them.67 
Further, Pettit’s presentation of ‘paradigm’ crimes in terms of wrongdoing that 
attracts citizens’ condemnation sits uneasily alongside his contention that the 
wrongdoing typically instantiates domination. People living under benign 
domination may – albeit wrongly - come to value (say) the judgment of the dominant 
person or people concerning their best interests, and hence fail to condemn the 
domination.68 Contrariwise, people may wrongly condemn conduct as worthy of 
criminalisation, as under the Uganda Anti-Homosexuality Act 2014, when it is not. 
Quite simply, it is unhelpful to tie a theory of criminalisation too tightly to the 
practice of condemnation. In some cases, widespread condemnation of seriously 
wrongful conduct may help to reinforce the moral case for criminalisation and for 
vigorous enforcement of the law. But equally, in other cases, such condemnation 
may, by (say) demonising certain types of offenders, make fair and proportionate 
enforcement hard to achieve without simultaneously exposing offenders to 
disproportionately hard treatment at the bar of public opinion.69 Contrariwise, an 
absence of public condemnation of conduct may mean that police and prosecutors 
struggle to make perfectly sound laws targeting significant wrongs achieve their 
legitimate deterrent and retributive aims, as in – for example -  many cases of 
copyright infringement. 
In the case of regulatory offences, Pettit’s analysis of such examples, as ones in 
which the law and offenders alike see them in terms of cost-benefit analysis, is 
distorted by his assumption that the fine – or analogous form of cost - is the only 
remedy appropriate for these offences; but this is not so. A number of significant 
activities, such as driving, require a licence if one is to engage in them lawfully, and 
loss of one’s licence may be a powerful sanction. A company director may also be 
                                                      
64 See Richard Posner, ‘An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law’ (1985) 85 Columbia Law Review 
1193. 
65 See e.g. John Finnis, ‘The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory’ (1984) 
1 Notre Dame Journal of Law Ethics and Public Policy 115. 
66 See, e.g. the approach of AP Simester and Andreas Von Hirsch, Crimes, Harms and Wrongs: On the 
Principles of Criminalisation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011). 
67 See e.g. Steven Lukes, n. 32 above, ch 4. 
68 See text following n. 10 above. 
69 An example might be prosecution of the crime of infanticide against mothers. 
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disqualified from acting, if found guilty of misconduct.70 A business may find itself 
struck off the register of companies, if it fails to file accounts (and ignores 
subsequent warnings).71 Under the Immigration Act 2016, a business with a history 
of employing illegal workers may be closed down by the enforcement authorities. 
Such sanctions are only artificially regarded as a mere ‘cost’, to be factored into a 
decision whether to continue with illegal activity regardless. They – quite deliberately 
- threaten the viability of engaging in the relevant business activity at all. Such 
examples illustrate the pointlessness of attempts to draw stark theoretical or 
practical contrasts between ‘real’ and ‘regulatory’ offending: the grey area between 
the two is too large for that.72 
 
 
 
4. REPUBLICAN FREEDOM, LIBERAL FREEDOM AND 
CRIMINAL LAW. 
 
I will conclude with some reflections on the relationship between Pettit’s 
republicanism and liberal political theory. For Pettit: 
 
Citizenship gives protection and constitutes freedom only so far as the law is 
appropriately framed, respected, and applied... [C]itizenship amounts to 
freedom only… in a society where cultural and institutional pressures are such 
that even if people are not always lovers of the good, still they can be relied 
upon to do their bit in the civic realm...73 
 
Freedom as non-domination is not, thus, a matter solely of law in the books. There 
must also be official action in accordance with declared rule,74 and more broadly 
and importantly, a culture sustained by citizens themselves in which the knowledge 
and exercise of freedoms is learned, valued, supported and promoted. In a 
republican spirit, for example, one should ask not just of the substantive law but 
also of the culture of law enforcement: is it, say, unacceptably authoritarian or 
patriarchal (a public negative),75 or on the contrary informed by a healthy respect 
for ‘anti-deference’ (a public good)?76  
                                                      
70 Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986. 
71 Companies Act 2006, s. 1000, as amended by the Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 
2015, s. 103. 
72 See Jeremy Horder, ‘Bureaucratic “Criminal” Law: Too Much of a Bad Thing?’, in RA Duff et al (eds), 
Criminalisation: The Political Morality of the Criminal Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 
73 Philip Pettit, n. 2 above, at 312. 
74 See further Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964). 
75 For two excellent discussions in different contexts, see Markus Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and 
the Foundations of American Government (New York: Columbia University Press. 2005); Michele Dempsey, 
Prosecuting Domestic Violence: A Philosophical Analysis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). On public 
negatives and criminal law, see Jeremy Horder (ed), n. 20 above. 
76 Vincent Chiao, n. 11 above, at 105-106. 
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There is no doubt that, on occasion, law reform is influenced by such 
considerations. In 2013, the UK Parliament abolished the former criminal 
prohibition on engaging (without more) in ‘insulting’ behaviour in public in England 
and Wales.77 The removal of the prohibition was intended to enhance the protection 
of citizens’ freedom of expression, reducing the fear of falling foul of the criminal 
law just because other people – including agents of law enforcement – were liable 
to take offence at someone’s robust outspokenness.78 The removal of the 
prohibition was thus designed, in Pettit’s terms, to enhance people’s prospects for 
enjoying a, ‘mutually reinforcing consciousness of enjoying… independence’. This 
latter feature of republican theory, largely lost in much of modern political culture, 
originally had a firm basis in the English ‘common mind’. As FW Maitland observed, 
when speaking of ordinary people’s belief in local or customary law administered by 
the Justices (as compared with law promulgated and adjudicated upon centrally): 
 
Englishmen have trusted the law; it were hardly too much to say that they have 
loved the law; but they have not loved and do not love lawyers, and the law 
that they have loved they did not think of as lawyers’ law… [it was] the voice 
of law [in the mouth of] many a country squire whose only juristic attainment 
was the possession of a clerk who could find the appropriate page in Burn’s 
Justice.79 
 
This dimension to republican theory is arguably its most distinctive contribution to 
social and political theory. In sophisticated liberal political theories, it is recognised 
that the value – indeed, the very possibility – of a personally autonomous life, 
depends on the existence of thriving social institutions and on the participation of 
others in lives in common.80 Generally lacking in liberal theory, though, is an 
account of how a liberty-loving political culture, embodied in both individual and 
common thought and practice, makes an essential contribution to the common 
weal.  
Even so, Pettit’s republican theory of freedom should be regarded as in this 
respect supplementing, rather than challenging, sophisticated liberal theories of 
freedom focused on personal autonomy.81 What Pettit’s theory adds is a theory of 
what it means to enjoy ‘political’ autonomy, alongside personal autonomy. In other 
words, to play one’s full part in a republican state is to be able – on the same basis 
as others, and in appropriate circumstances in combination with them – to engage 
in valuable political activity, as oneself (part) author of that activity.  
                                                      
77 Crime and Courts Act 2013, s. 57. 
78 http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/p_to_r/public_order_offences/#Section_5. 
79 FW Maitland, ‘The Shadows and Silences of Real Life’, in HAL Fisher (ed), The Collected Papers of Frederick 
William Maitland (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), vol I, at 476-77. 
80 See, generally, Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986). 
81 See ibid. In that respect, Pettit has simply overlooked the ways in which modern liberal theory had 
already moved on – at the time Pettit was writing - from understanding liberty in terms of Berlin’s over-
simplistic contrast between negative and positive liberty. 
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The suspicion that Pettit’s theory is indeed autonomy focused, and hence 
essentially liberal in orientation, comes in the following passage (very similar to the 
one in which Finnis criticised domination, years ago82), where he emphases the 
impact that domination threatens to one choices in life, large and small: 
 
Being dominated involves occupying a position where another can interfere on 
an arbitrary basis in your life: specifically… where another can interfere with 
greater or lesser ease on a more or less arbitrary basis across a smaller or larger 
range of choices.83 
 
Theoretically, this position appears to map quite closely on to Joseph Raz’s view 
that, to use Raz’s own example, where I must share life on a small island largely 
devoid of secure shelter with a wild tiger, I will lack autonomy, because my life will 
be effectively ruled by the need to avoid the potential threat.84 The point is not 
necessarily that, in this situation, I cannot make valuable choices of any kind.85 The 
point is simply that the threat hanging over me deprives me of the chance for a fully 
autonomous life, a life that includes stable long-term commitments and plans for 
worthwhile personal development, alongside valuable day-to-day decisions. For 
Pettit, of course, Raz’s example should not be compared with one involving 
domination, because the impact of the tiger’s threat is to deprive one of effective 
republican freedom, not formal republican freedom. Even so, Raz’s liberal account 
of how one may come to lack freedom has crucial advantages over Pettit’s 
domination-focused theory.  
To begin with, there is an important ambiguity about the wrong of domination. 
Is what makes domination qualitatively worse than other kinds of loss of freedom 
simply the fact that X has an unconstrained power over Y? Alternatively, is it the 
case that, in order to identify the wrong in domination, must one conjoin with X’s 
unconstrained power over Y an assumption that the power also impinges on Y’s 
life, ‘across a smaller or larger range of choices’,86 in unacceptable ways? Let me 
expand on this point. Alongside his ‘slave’ example – where, clearly, a master will 
have unconstrained power over almost every dimension of the slave’s life – Pettit 
includes examples in which an employee or debtor, ‘lives under the thumb’ of the 
employer or creditor respectively.87 It is, of course, a commonplace that, as your 
employer or creditor, I may well be able to demand that you work, or pay your debt, 
when it is convenient for me but highly inconvenient – possible, even ruinous - for 
you to do so. So, it is unclear where the wrong lies in the employer or debtor having 
the relevant power. It may be that what Pettit has in mind when speaking of the 
                                                      
82 See text at n. 19 above. 
83 Philip Pettit, n. 2 above, at 341. 
84 Joseph Raz, n. 80 above, at 374. 
85 It may be that, unbeknownst to me, the tiger would rather die than have to attack and eat me, and so 
(without knowing it) I could in fact enjoy a fully autonomous life, in so far as life on such an island allows 
for that. 
86 See passage cited at n. 83 above. 
87 Philip Pettit, n. 3 above, at 64-65. 
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wrong in such cases is a situation in which, such is the hold that the one has over 
the other that, in effect, the employer or creditor controls much of the employee or 
debtor’s life. This would be a disproportionate control relative to the relationship in 
question, a point brought home to Charles Dickens when his father was imprisoned 
for debt.  
Such an analysis, though, would make the wrong in domination turn, in part, 
on an evaluation of nature and degree of control that the power confers. That kind 
of analysis runs counter to the formal nature of the domination to which Pettit 
objects: any cases where the nature of the power I have over you is such that I can 
exercise it to please myself, or to prefer some ‘alien interest’,88 to your interests. Yet, 
this appears to rule out almost all significant employer-employee or debtor-creditor 
relationships (even for as little as £1), as forms of exploitative domination. For, 
Pettit does not provide a theory of justified, intentional use of power over another, 
beyond suggesting that such a power can be justified if the power serves only the 
interests of the person over whom it is held.89 In other words, he does not explain 
how, if at all, employer-employee or debtor-creditor relationships (amongst others) 
can serve the interests of employees or debtors, even though those relationships 
allow the employer or creditor some control over the employee or debtor that can 
be exercised, ‘according to their own arbitrium’.90  
An analysis of such cases in terms of personal autonomy provides a simpler 
way in which to understand their (un)justifiability, because it is not tied to a 
distinction between form and substance in the manner of Pettit’s domination 
theory. Properly regulated employer-employee and debtor-creditor relationships are 
social forms capable of providing a setting in which both parties can enhance their 
personal autonomy. It is, of course, a different matter if these relationships edge 
into vehicles for exploitation, as in the case of ‘extortionate’ credit bargains,91 or 
‘aggressive’ selling practices (when the criminal law may come in92). Even so, the 
movement from an autonomy-enhancing to an autonomy-reducing relationship of 
this kind is best understood as one of degree. It involves a substantial grey area, in 
which the existence of formal domination comes to be perceived as wrong only 
when – to an extent it will be hard to clarify in advance, as in the examples just 
given93 – it also involves a lack of effective republican freedom. Our understanding 
is not helped by starting from the proposition that all such relationships are 
presumptively ones of unjustified domination. 
That brings me to the general justification in Pettit’s theory for state 
institutions, like criminal law and punishment. Does the republican perspective on 
these institutions add something distinctive, not found in liberal theory? Pettit says: 
                                                      
88 See text at n. 3 above. 
89 See ibid. 
90 See text at n. 2 above. 
91 Consumer Credit Act 1974, ss. 137-138. 
92 The Consumer Protection from Unfair Trading Regulations 2008, s. 7. 
93 See text at n. 88 and n. 89. 
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The interests which a republican state ought to track are interests that each 
shares… with others… And so penal interference will be non-arbitrary, and 
saliently non-arbitrary, so far as it tracks interests that the offender shares with 
others… in accordance with shared ideals. It will [then] be non-arbitrary… 
even when the pursuit of those interests means frustrating the wish of the 
offender to be given a special deal.94 
 
This shared interest-based argument does not appear to have a special connection 
with the institutions of criminal justice. It seems to be an argument apt to support 
any state institutions which help us to achieve common goals that cannot adequately 
be achieved through the mere aggregation of individual actions. State-enforced 
systems of taxation are an example. Pettit’s argument is really another way of saying 
that state institutions, including law (and hence the institutions of criminal justice), 
can – depending on why and how they act – exercise legitimate authority. Such an 
argument is perfectly consistent with a liberal account of the legitimacy of state 
institutions; but Pettit considerably underplays the complexity of explaining 
legitimate authority in this respect.  
In the passage just cited, in his contrast between acting on interests in ‘shared 
ideals’, whilst frustrating any given individual offender’s interest in a ‘special deal’, 
Pettit seems to be alluding to the way that the state can act authoritatively in solving 
prisoners’ dilemma situations. These are situations in which everyone has an interest 
in a common solution, and no interest in abandonment of the common solution, 
but the best deal for any given individual is that others follow the common solution 
whilst he or she receives special treatment.95 Through coercing people into 
following the common solution, the law acts with legitimate authority in removing 
or substantially reducing the incentive for any given individual actively to seek the 
‘best’ solution for themselves. Yet, there are a number of other bases on which the 
law may claim legitimate authority. Raz, for example, discusses five in all.96  
One example is the need to co-ordinate conduct, even in circumstances where 
there is no prisoner’s dilemma, because there is no particular incentive to seek a 
special deal for oneself. A frequently cited example involves the rules of the road. 
We all have an interest in certain common road traffic solutions, such as a clear 
determination of which side of the road to drive, where it would make little sense 
for someone to seek a special deal for themselves (given the need to co-ordinate 
their conduct with others). Another example is the requirement for political parties 
to publish election spending accounts in a specified form, imposed – on pain of 
criminal penalty for breach – by section 47 of the Political Parties, Elections and 
Referendums Act 2000. In this case, there is a common interest in the accounts of 
all parties being published in the same form, so that they may easily be compared, 
but no political party has an interest in a special deal relaxing the requirements of 
                                                      
94 Philip Pettit, n. 3 above, at 73. 
95 See the discussion in Scott Shapiro, ‘Authority’, in Jules Coleman and Scott Shapiro, The Oxford 
Handbook of Jurisprudence & Philosophy of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), at 406. 
96 See Joseph Raz, n. 73 above, at 75. 
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the common solution, because such a special deal would risk impairing the public’s 
perception of that party’s financial probity. The function of the criminal law in such 
cases is to ensure that the common solution remains ‘common’, and is not 
abandoned through the agreement of affected parties, through misunderstanding, 
neglect, or otherwise. 
Another of Raz’s examples of the need for law’s authority was long ago 
foreshadowed by Blackstone, one of Pettit’s ‘republican’ thinkers.97 This is where 
there is a risk that people may feel empowered to act with a self-centred disregard 
for others’ key interests, not least when they themselves believe they have been 
wronged. As Blackstone put it:  
 
In a state of society this [natural] right [to punish] is transferred from 
individuals to the sovereign power; whereby men are prevented from being 
judges in their own causes, which is one of the evils that civil government was 
intended to remedy…. [The magistrate]… bears the sword  of justice by the 
consent of the whole community.98 
 
Blackstone may have given us no reason for thinking that the ‘right to punish’ really 
is a right possessed in the state of nature, and surrendered to the forces of law and 
order, for so long as the latter endeavour to, ‘do right to all manner of people after 
the laws and usages of this realm, without fear or favour, affection or ill will’.99 Even 
so, the need adequately to deter people from acting as ‘judges in their causes’, when 
their actions impinge on the vital interests of others, is real enough. 
The justification for the authority of the criminal law is not just ‘top-down’, in 
the manner of the justifications just given. It is also ‘bottom-up’, both absolutely - 
in relation to the existence of the law in general – and contingently, when it is sought 
to enforce it on particular people or groups in particular circumstances. As Niki 
Lacey has put it: 
 
[I]t is the underlying bedrock of social support for criminal law which 
underpins the widespread voluntary compliance without which the hierarchical 
regulatory resources of the criminal process at the monitoring and enforcement 
levels would be entirely incapable of delivering the most modest of regulatory 
objectives.100 
 
                                                      
97 See e.g. Philip Pettit, n. 3 above, at 60. 
98 Sir William Blackstone, n. 7 above, vol iv, at 7-8. 
99 The judicial oath: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/the-judiciary-the-government-
and-the-constitution/oaths/. 
100 Niki Lacey, ‘Criminalisation as Regulation: the Role of the Criminal Law’, in C Parker et al (eds), 
Regulating Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) 144-167, at 150. 
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There is, perhaps, little here with which Pettit would disagree. Even so, he has more 
work to do to show that we should prefer his analysis of freedom, and the 
foundations of the criminal justice system, to a liberal account.  
For Pettit, in discussing their conception of freedom, ‘liberals after Bentham 
came to care only about coercion of the body or will’,101 and hence ignored the 
republican political heritage that should have enriched that conception. That claim 
almost wilfully overlooks the richer conceptions of freedom being developed by 
liberals, in the century between the writings of TH Green (through Isaiah Berlin) 
and Joseph Raz. With varying degrees of sophistication, those conceptions sought 
to plot a course between, and perhaps to draw something from each of, the 
Benthamite focus on the mere absence of coercion, and the equation of freedom 
with engagement in feelings and activities that one (rationally) ought to find 
liberating. In Pettit’s theory, thus, one gains no sense of the relevance of, for 
example, incommensurability to the way in which this course is plotted (a major 
concern for Berlin), or of the state’s role in ensuring – through its own direct actions 
or through support for voluntary bodies - that there is an adequate range of valuable 
options and worthwhile activities for citizens (a concern for Green and Raz). On 
Pettit’s theory, such concerns are left unaddressed because they have been largely 
relegated to the domain of effective republican freedom. One task undertaken here 
has been to show, with a particular but not exclusive focus on the criminal law, that 
the distinction between formal and effective republican theory does not have the 
moral and legal significance that Pettit attributes to it. Consequently, in the light of 
the foregoing discussion, we have no reason to prefer Pettit’s republicanism to those 
richer, liberal accounts of freedom. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
101 Philip Pettit, n. 2 above, at 341. 
